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Essay 
 
AVE ATQUE VALE 
PETER E. QUINT 
I thought, since I have been here a long time, that it might be interesting, 
particularly for newer members of the faculty, if I said a few words about the 
way things were in the law school in an earlier period and also mentioned a 
few of our colleagues of the past who contributed a particular tone to the 
school.  And I’ll say a bit about my own experiences as well. 
When I arrived here in the autumn of 1972, this wonderful building 
which we now inhabit did not exist and the law school had its quarters in a 
considerably smaller structure roughly on the same spot.  The Thurgood 
Marshall Law Library did not exist either (the library was in the main body 
of the building) and where our library is now, there was a large green lawn 
particularly favored for touch football. 
In the 1970s, the faculty seemed divided between the old guard—a 
conservative group of what seemed to me like elderly gents—some people in 
the middle, and a smaller group of young turks with lots of hair, of which I 
was one, I suppose.  In fact, students have told me that I was sometimes 
known as “Rasputin” in those days. 
But soon there was an influx of younger faculty members with a 
distinctly 60’s left-liberal orientation, a number of whom are happily here 
today.  These refugees from the 60’s gave a sympathetic and rather laid-back 
tone to the law school.  It was this, I think, together with the fact that, in those 
days, the emphasis seemed to be primarily on teaching, that contributed to 
establishing a remarkably relaxed and friendly atmosphere within the faculty 
that has lasted for many years—even after things changed (no doubt 
properly) to the more earnest emphasis on scholarship that we have today. 
Certainly, one of the great pleasures of the law school over the years has 
been what I would call its—at least—moderate lefty-ness, which provides an 
atmosphere in which one can actually breathe.  I remember once visiting 
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Wayne State Law School where I had taught in the distant past.  We were 
chatting at mid-morning coffee when another faculty member came in (I 
think he is now a very eminent teacher of antitrust) and he proposed a subject 
for discussion that obviously meant a lot to him: he asked us each to suggest 
our favorite candidate for the governmental agency that should be abolished 
first.  (Incidentally, he suggested abolition of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on the grounds that not much actual securities fraud was going 
on.  Even in the days before Bernie Madoff, this was breathtaking.) 
In any event, my point is that we’ve never had to put up much with that 
sort of thing here.  Indeed, one of the most admirable traits of this great 
faculty is its predominant focus on the public interest—work against 
discrimination of all sorts, advocacy of environmental protection, work for 
tax reform and against urban poverty.  There are thousands of examples of 
these projects, but I mention only Doug Colbert’s decades-long campaign for 
legal representation of defendants at bail hearings, Karen Czapanskiy’s great 
work on gender bias in the courts some years ago, and Rena Steinzor’s hair 
raising—and completely convincing—jeremiads against the weakness of 
environmental regulation today. 
Another great aspect of life and work at the law school, which has been 
most deeply gratifying for me, is our complete freedom to choose our own 
path in research and scholarship.  For example, in the forty-three years that I 
have been here I don’t think we have ever hired anyone specifically to teach 
comparative law—Hungdah Chiu may be a partial exception to this—but a 
number of us have turned decisively in this direction by our own choice.  I 
would mention our retired colleague, Ted Tomlinson, a scholar in contracts 
and administrative law, whose wonderful comparative work in French law 
has always been a great inspiration to me1; and Marley Weiss, originally and 
still a labor lawyer, who accomplished the almost unbelievable feat of 
learning Hungarian as an adult to the point of being able to teach and write 
in that language, and to do research in Hungarian law.  And about midway 
through my own work here, I shifted from writing about American 
constitutional law to at least a pretty substantial admixture of work on 
comparative constitutional law, particularly on the constitutional law of 
Germany. 
Moreover, for many years we have had a quite favorable faculty-student 
ratio.  This has not only permitted the extensive growth of clinics which are 
very labor intensive, but also has meant that we have had, on the whole, 
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considerable freedom in the choice and composition of courses.  So we are 
free to teach courses such as, for example (I select not entirely at random) the 
Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany—a course that I 
taught for a number of years (although I was never successful in making it a 
required course—that’s a joke).  This ability to choose and create seminars 
has made it possible to reap the extraordinary benefits—for us and for our 
students, as well—of having courses which arise out of the teacher’s deep 
scholarly endeavors or other abiding interests.  This excellence of the school 
is reflected in the schedules of all of us, and so I just mention a couple, more 
or less at random: Bill Reynolds’s much sought-after seminar in art law, and, 
among our remarkable younger faculty members, Amanda Pustilnik’s 
seminar in Neuroscience and the Law, and Michael Pappas’s seminar on 
Food, Farming and Sustainability, and his seminar on Natural Resources, 
which focuses on the legal implications of global warming and water 
shortages. 
And perhaps this is the moment for me to say—certainly not an original 
thought by any means—that the younger members of the faculty who have 
joined us in the last few years represent a truly extraordinary group of 
teachers and scholars whose presence bodes very well for the future of this 
institution. 
When I first signed the agreement to come here, I remember Dean 
Cunningham calling me on the telephone (I was still in New York, winding 
up my affairs there) and he read me a long list of courses, saying, “We need 
someone to teach these, why don’t you choose a couple?”  If the Dean had 
insisted, I probably would have taught Corporations—the subject of much of 
my legal practice in New York—but on the list was Constitutional Law and, 
of course, I couldn’t turn that down.  And so that early phone call on a sunny 
morning in New York was pretty fateful for me, although I probably didn’t 
realize it at the time. 
Another very happy chance occurred in 1976 when a group of German 
academics from Heidelberg came to spend a day at the law school.  I had 
always maintained an interest in the German language since I had studied it 
in college, and I had engaged in conversations about German law at Wayne 
with my friend Fritz Juenger, a German academic then establishing himself 
in the United States.  As a result, I spent some time talking with those German 
visitors in 1976.  When I had a sabbatical looming a year or two later I wrote 
to one of them to ask if he knew of a place where I could spend a sabbatical 
year in Germany.  Unbeknownst to me, he was an important figure at the Max 
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in 
Heidelberg—probably the very best place in Germany for an American to 
dive into the waters of German constitutional law—and so this was a very 
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happy accident that sent me again in a direction I found very gratifying and 
fruitful.  Sometime after my sabbatical in Heidelberg, I also spent a year in 
Tübingen, a medieval university town of great charm, where I collaborated 
with a German colleague in teaching a course on American constitutional law 
to remarkably interested and talented German students; and I also spent a 
fateful sabbatical year in Berlin about which I’ll say a word in a few 
moments. 
I have had a lot of fun, and very deep satisfaction, in writing, or in trying 
to write, articles (and books) on the law—an endeavor on which we spend a 
lot of our time, although sometimes outside observers of law faculties don’t 
fully understand that. 
Perhaps the most exciting of my projects started when, to everyone’s 
surprise, the Berlin Wall was opened by some confused and bewildered East 
German border guards on a cold November evening in 1989.  Obviously the 
social and political aspects of this event and what followed were of primary 
importance, but there were also a lot of significant legal and particularly 
constitutional problems involved as well.  I was able to go to Berlin a month 
and a half later, at the beginning of January 1990, and I spent two weeks there 
doing interviews with political figures in East Germany across the political 
spectrum—from the new parties of the citizens’ movement to the hard-line 
Communist Party, which was then declining precipitately in power.2 
Most exciting was the evening of January 8, 1990, when I observed, or 
participated in, one of the huge Monday night protest marches which a few 
weeks earlier had toppled the hard-line East German regime: a scene of 
hundreds of thousands of people walking around the Ring in Leipzig, the 
street that a century earlier had replaced the old city walls.  At that point, no 
one foresaw rapid German unification and everyone assumed that a 
democratic East Germany would arise and exist for some years at least; and 
so this was a great time of constitutional ferment, as people with democratic 
political yearnings, now suddenly set free, began to work on proposals for a 
new democratic East German constitution.  In my interviews I tried to elicit 
views from all sides about what a new constitution of East Germany should 
look like.  On the evening of January eighth, I was invited to attend one of 
these drafting sessions in Leipzig for a citizens’ party called “New Forum.”  
It was exhilarating to see a young man come in from the great demonstration, 
place a banner with some democratic slogan against the wall, and then sit 
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down to help draft and debate the details of fundamental constitutional 
provisions. 
About two years later, shortly after German unification, I was fortunate 
to be able to live in Berlin for a sabbatical year and to pursue these interviews, 
now with people in East Germany who had participated in the events of 
unification—and also in the drafting of democratic constitutions for the 
newly created Eastern German states.  It was great to be able to talk to these—
mainly young—people who had participated in these stirring events.  The 
most amazing of the interviews was a four-hour conversation with Lothar de 
Maizière, who had been the first and only democratically elected Prime 
Minister of East Germany.  We talked a lot about the events of German 
unification, but what was most impressive to me was that de Maizière, a 
former professional viola player who had turned to law after a hand injury 
ended his musical career, was clearly one of the very most brilliant and 
cultivated people I had ever met—much to my surprise, in light of his rather 
bumbling depiction in the press.  Well I still have the tapes of this 
conversation somewhere, but as time goes by, it may be more and more 
difficult to find the antiquated equipment necessary to play them. 
Some years later, in writing about civil disobedience in Germany, I also 
did many interviews with members of the German peace movement of the 
1980’s—and with the prosecutors who prosecuted them and the judges who 
judged them.3  In the case of the German peace demonstrators, as with the 
participants in German unification, these events seemed to be the high point 
of their lives, and it was easy to evoke a flood of enlightening memories. 
Teaching the classes here—particularly constitutional law in its various 
forms—has also been a great joy and I have been joined in that exciting 
endeavor by wonderfully talented colleagues.  I would like to mention, 
particularly, Dave Bogen, my predecessor as well as my colleague, whose 
great articles on constitutional law helped to point the way in teaching that 
deep and complex subject.4 
And of course I have had many remarkable students—beginning with 
Paige Marvel and her extraordinary class whom I had as students in the very 
first year that I taught here.  Another student in those early years was Elijah 
Cummings—now my representative in Congress in my Baltimore City 
district—who has been playing such a valiant role on the streets of the city in 
the last few days.  Other memorable students from the past are happily here 
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today, including Bonnie and Mike Travieso, Sandy Cohen, Robin West, and 
Markus Rauschecker. 
I would like to say a word or two about another memorable student in 
constitutional law—a student from many years ago who is now sadly 
deceased.  This was Alfred Mollin, who, at the time that he was taking the 
evening program here, was also a full time professor (they call them “tutors”) 
at St. John’s College in Annapolis.  He was responsible—as were the rest of 
the St. John’s tutors—for teaching everything, from DNA to calculus to 
ancient Greek.  Mollin’s brilliance was extraordinary, and when he 
graduated, he gave me as a present a two volume textbook of ancient Greek 
grammar that he and a colleague had written.5  That’s a present you don’t get 
every day from your students.  Mollin eventually left St. John’s and went on 
to have a distinguished career as an appellate lawyer in the Justice 
Department. 
As I look back over more than forty years, there is a lot to think about 
and a lot of people to recall.  You come in as a young turk and you go out as 
an old geezer and you meet a lot of people in between.  So I’ll say a word or 
two about a few colleagues who are no longer with us but who, in their 
various ways, contributed to the history and atmosphere of this law school, 
and contributed quite a lot to my own education as well.  These are all people 
who have been gone for quite a few years now and are probably not known 
to most (or at least very many) of the faculty today. 
I remember with particular warmth Everett Goldberg, a man of immense 
talent and sharpness of mind.  He was Associate Dean of the law school for 
many years and during that period, according to Dean Kelly, his “integrity. . . 
inherent decency [and] thoughtfulness” were “the soul of the [institution].”6  
Rett, as he was called, had spent two years as a Peace Corps volunteer 
teaching law in Ethiopia before coming to the law school.  In the first year 
that I was here I audited Rett’s great course in African law which was an 
extraordinary combination of traditional law, colonial law, and the law of the 
new—then, very new—independent African states.  This magisterial course 
was a high point in my education in comparative law.  Rett never gave this 
wonderful course again—I don’t know why; the enrollment was certainly 
good.  It was like a rare African flower that bloomed once but was to bloom 
no more. 
A considerably more problematic, but quite fascinating character, was 
Max Isenbergh.  Max had an extraordinary record at the Harvard Law School.  
He was a law clerk of Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, and he seemed to 
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know all the great legal and political figures of his generation and the 
generation immediately preceding his, as well.  (One day, for example, he 
showed me correspondence to him from the former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson.)  Although Max had clerked for Justice Black, he didn’t have much 
to say about Black, but he had a lot to say about two other justices whom he 
knew well, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter.  His reflections on Douglas 
were not complimentary, to say the least.  With Frankfurter he had a close, 
almost familial relationship, which is described in a wonderful piece by Max 
in the Virginia Law Review some decades ago.7  Max taught constitutional 
law, antitrust, and legal process.  In constitutional law he had very strong, 
clear ideas about what the Constitution meant and, in many instances, those 
views were decidedly not the views of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
Max was actually a torn spirit.  He had great legal abilities, but he was 
also a clarinetist who played at a professional level, and perhaps he never 
quite decided which path he should follow.  When Max retired, he agreed to 
have a farewell ceremony like this one, but with the condition that there 
should be no speeches.  Rather he, and a quartet of string players from 
Peabody Institute, would play the Mozart clarinet quintet.  The ceremony 
went off in a manner truly characteristic of Max.  Two or three minutes into 
the quintet, Max abruptly stopped the music.  He didn’t like the way the 
Peabody students were playing it.  He gave them a few moments of no doubt 
stern instruction about how the piece ought to be performed.  They started 
again and played the piece through beautifully. 
Let me also briefly mention two more colleagues of the past.  There was 
a substantial period, I think, when John Brumbaugh was one of the central 
figures of the law school faculty.  (And his widow, Alice, is here today—this 
was an intra-mural law school romance).  John was always beautifully 
dressed in a suit and tie, and he possessed a wonderful fluency of expression 
and a quasi-British style and precision.  John taught evidence, criminal law, 
and jurisprudence, and his students found him a challenging and inspirational 
teacher with a very subtle sense of humor and extraordinary devotion to the 
University of Maryland School of Law.8  John was a traditionalist and 
occasionally grumbled a bit about certain innovations in legal education, such 
as the clinics.  But it was a tribute to the tone of friendship and solidarity that 
prevailed at the law school (and also a tribute to John’s good nature) that this 
never descended into any kind of personal unfriendliness, as it had in so many 
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other institutions.  John was universally liked and admired throughout the 
faculty. 
Well, I cannot speak of all of our departed colleagues, and so I have only 
mentioned those from the rather distant past whom I knew the best.  But I do 
want to say a word about one of the youngest of them, Marc Feldman. 
In the law, Marc was an adventurer or, as I said in a memorial piece 
then, an explorer.9  His views contradicted much of what was generally 
accepted in legal education at the time.  Indeed, on the view that law school 
itself, as things were then taught, ignored the social context of law and 
downplayed the problems of the poor, Marc decided not to obtain a J.D. 
degree at all, but rather to enter the bar by reading in a law office—a 
nineteenth-century method that had survived in a few states only.  After 
joining the bar in this manner, Marc worked for the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission and directed a federal legal services office, providing legal 
representation for the poor.  Here at Maryland, Marc was one of the chief 
theorists of the noted Legal Theory and Practice program, which sought to 
expose students to the social meaning of legal problems.  In his work, Marc 
had become interested in the problems faced by public education, as an 
instance of broader institutional failure, and he spent the last active year of 
his life on sabbatical leave, observing public education and teaching at three 
public schools in New York City—an unusual choice for a law school 
sabbatical and another example of Marc’s audacious exploration.  He planned 
to write about these experiences in a work that would have been, perhaps, 
part critique and part memoir.  But sadly it was not to be.  He suffered the 
onset of his fatal illness as he was returning to Baltimore in the summer after 
his sabbatical year in New York.  Marc had a number of very close friends 
on the faculty, among them Max Chibundu and also Richard Boldt—who 
later wrote a major appreciation of Marc’s work in the Maryland Law 
Review.10  As with the others I have mentioned, those who knew Marc still 
mourn his loss. 
I think the law school has been very fortunate in the deans who have 
arrived since I have been here.  As Greg Young has said, Mike Kelly, who 
served an extraordinary tenure of sixteen years, should be considered—when 
the history of the law school is written—really as the founder of the modern 
University of Maryland School of Law.  He was the originator or early 
decisive supporter of many things that we take for granted now—one might 
mention particularly the clinical program, the Health Law program and the 
Environmental program.  But it hardly ends there, and I would like to say a 
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word about one other particularly notable aspect of Michael’s tenure.  Mike 
was (and remains) deeply interested in legal ethics from a philosophical point 
of view, and for a substantial period under Mike’s aegis and thereafter there 
was a strong and explicit philosophical emphasis at the law school.  Not only 
were we fortunate to have eminent philosophical writers such as David Luban 
and, later, Robin West on the faculty itself—but a wonderful institution 
called the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at College Park (now 
sadly dispersed, I am afraid) was very closely associated with the law school.  
David was originally one of the philosophers from that center, as well as 
Professor Judith Lichtenberg, David’s wife, and a number of other very 
brilliant (and in some cases somewhat eccentric) individuals.  They would 
often come to the law school for philosophy reading groups, and they also 
taught a number of elective courses here, such as the philosophy of 
environmental protection, and the philosophy of the law of torts, a seminar 
that I had the pleasure of auditing years ago.  In the philosophy reading group 
we read Rawls, Kant, Aristotle and others with some success; it was only 
Hegel who defeated us.  Incidentally, Greg Young mentioned the philosophy 
reading groups as well, and I’m very happy to acknowledge the presence here 
today of a great stalwart of those groups, Ken Abraham, now at Virginia. 
Among deans after Mike Kelly, Don Gifford had the foresight and 
acumen to plan this wonderful building in which we now reside, and 
somehow—it still seems like a sort of miracle to me—to get it approved 
through the layers of bureaucracy (ahead, I am told, of some supposedly prior 
university projects).  Karen Rothenberg shepherded the building to its 
completion and, among many other accomplishments, greatly strengthened 
our faculty through the recruitment of some of our extraordinary younger 
faculty members—including some who are involved in the area of health law, 
Karen’s first love and first focus of responsibility at the law school.  Phoebe 
Haddon was here for a shorter period, but she brought us the name of Francis 
King Carey (and very substantial benefits therewith).  And it was also under 
Phoebe’s guidance that we were joined by the more recent of our brilliant 
younger colleagues. 
Donald Tobin, a native Marylander, has only recently arrived—but he 
has been marshaling deliberation, skill and sensitivity in confronting the 
current financial problems facing this institution as well as most other law 
schools in the country. 
So, looking back on this parade of individuals and parade of courses, 
articles and other work over the years, we may ask for the major theme.  As 
I suggested before, I was and remain at least to some extent a refugee from 
the 60’s, and back in those days it was common to hear law teachers say 
something to the following effect: we are not teaching justice here, we are 
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teaching law.  Even the revered Oliver Wendell Holmes said things like that 
sometimes. 
But it seems to me that you can’t really teach law if you don’t think that 
you are teaching justice or at least teaching people how to strive for justice, 
and in your own work seeking justice.  Justice may come in many forms; it 
may not always be the precise result that you would choose in a particular 
situation, for procedural regularity and the rule of law are certainly 
components of justice and may sometimes require a result different from the 
result that you might choose if you had your completely open and free choice.  
But it seems to me that the whole lesson of the Socratic method—a method 
in which I was taught at the Harvard Law School now more than fifty years 
ago, and the method that I still think shows the finest traits of a legal 
education—cannot be understood other than as a relentless quest for justice.  
In the Socratic method, the relentless questioning of one argument over 
another, one result over another, one explanation over another comes down 
basically to the question of what is best for society and the individual and 
whether society or the individual should be preferred in particular 
circumstances when there is tension or dispute between them.  In this sense, 
justice is something outside of and beyond the law, against which the law 
must be measured.  And I believe that the process of learning and teaching 
the law is the process of (articulately or inarticulately) seeking to develop an 
understanding of justice and then seeking to refine the law so that it accords 
more perfectly with that ideal. 
Well, in any case, that’s my homily for today.  I rarely get to deliver 
homilies, and so I am happy to deliver this one.  And because my time is 
drawing to a close, I will end with a joke. 
 This is not a new joke—in fact it’s a very old joke. 
I told this joke at a similar gathering when I left the law firm in New 
York in 1972, and indeed a colleague Alan Hornstein told this joke at a 
similar event here not so long ago.  But it is a good joke and a pertinent joke 
and so I’ll tell it again. 
It seems that the playwright S. N. Behrman had spent some time writing 
scripts in Hollywood but was about to return to New York, and so there was 
a gala dinner in his honor before his departure, which lasted late into the 
night. 
The following morning, however, Behrman had to go into the office to 
pick up some last papers, and there in the corridor he encountered the always 
dangerous George S. Kaufman, the famous playwright.  Kaufman fastened 
upon him his gimlet eye and said to Behrman: 
“Ah–hah!  Forgotten but not gone!” 
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Well, this is a pertinent story because I will be keeping my office, 
staying in my office.  (It may not always be too easy to find me in there, with 
its furnishings of stacks of papers that give, you might say, a sympathetic 
tone to the office—but I’ll be there basically.)  I’ll be working on some old 
projects and some new projects in constitutional law and in comparative law, 
and—who knows?—perhaps I’ll have a chance to revisit Alfred Mollin’s 
monumental two volumes. 
In any case, I won’t be gone. 
And I’ll try to make enough of the right kind of noise—or as one famous 
writer put it, the right kind of legal music—so that I won’t be entirely 
forgotten either. 
Thank you. 
 
